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J.B. Harley’s pioneering work in the critical 
study of cartography, “Silences and Secrecy: The 
Hidden Agenda of Cartography in Early Modern 
Europe,” now seems a bit dated, especially in its 
attacks on what was then a much more teleologi-
cal history of cartography, and like most of 
Harley’s work it focuses solely on the Western 
European experience. 1   Nevertheless, Harley 
makes a number of thought-provoking points, and 
here I want to reconsider his arguments and ex-
tend them to the context of early modern Japa-
nese mapmaking. Pace Harley, the present article 
will discuss how scholarship published within the 
last five years, mostly in Japanese, shows that 
what is left unsaid in maps—who controls what 
appears on the map and what does not, and when 
and why such control is exercised—can tell us as 
much about power relations in early modern Ja-
pan as what is actually “there” on the printed 
page. 
 
                                                  
*Author’s note: The “event” that occasioned 
my rereading of Harley’s article was Phil 
Brown’s invitation to speak at the Early Modern 
Japan Network session at the 2004 Annual 
Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies. I 
would like to thank him for the initial invitation 
and for his extraordinary patience and persistence 
in seeing this article to print. I would also like to 
thank the three anonymous readers for EMJ, 
whose fully justified criticisms confirmed my 
own sense that an earlier version of this article 
was itself in dire need of strategic silencing. 
 
1 Imago Mundi 40 (1988): 57-76; reprinted in 
J.B. Harley, The New Nature of Maps: Essays in 
the History of Cartography, edited by Paul 
Laxton (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2002), pp. 83-108. All citations 
are to the 1988 Imago Mundi version.  
Harley makes the observation, now common-
place in recent critical spatial studies, that “car-
tography was primarily a form of political dis-
course concerned with the acquisition and main-
tenance of power.”2 Rather than analyze what 
early modern European map discourses articulate, 
he focused on what they excluded. Harley argues 
that there are two kinds of “cartographic silence”: 
1) silence due to politically motivated secrecy or 
censorship3, and 2) “indeterminate silences” aris-
ing from discursive or intellectual presupposi-
tions that privilege certain types of knowledge or 
information over others.4 The first category in-
cludes strategic secrecy, for example, state maps 
of boundaries or other map information poten-
tially useful as military intelligence. By contrast, 
the second type of what he calls “indeterminate 
silence” is not caused by direct suppression or 
censorship but by “a sort of subconscious men-
talité that mediates the knowledge contained in 
maps in order to maintain the political status quo 
and the power of the state.”5 Harley asserts that 
in early modern Europe the ascendance of scien-
tific discourse to the status of truth led to assump-
tions that there was an objective world in which 
“the ‘universal science of measurement and or-
der’ and the principle of classification or ordered 
tabulation,” would always be able to represent the 
world accurately and unproblematically, and that 
this sort of standardization “with its Euclidian 
emphasis on space as uniform and continuous, 
generates the silences of uniformity.”6 
Insofar as Harley’s category of “strategic se-
crecy” refers to the competitive and often com-
bative relationships between nation states within 
early modern Europe, his arguments at first 
glance seem to apply poorly to early modern Ja-
pan. However, while it is true that the Tokugawa 
shogunal government did not map Japan in the 
context of international competition for power in 
the manner of contemporary European states, 
early modern Japanese domestic politics had its 
own internal tensions in which shogunal power 
                                                  
2 Harley, “Silences and Secrecy,” p. 57. 
3 Harley, “Silences and Secrecy,” pp. 60-61. 
4 Harley, “Silences and Secrecy,” pp. 65-70. 
5 Harley, “Silences and Secrecy,” pp. 57. 
6 Harley, “Silences and Secrecy,” p. 65. 
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and prerogatives were often exercised with an eye 
to subordinating the daimyo and other local 
power holders, who in turn reacted to and retali-
ated against those measures if and when it was 
possible and politically advantageous to do so. As 
we shall see, mapmaking played a significant role 
in these contests for political power. With regard 
to Harley’s second type of cartographic silence, 
the suppression of alternative or unorthodox dis-
courses on the face of the map, the comparison 
again seems a poor fit, considering that the “uni-
versal science of measurement and order” did not 
attain the degree of orthodoxy in Japan that it did 
in Europe. Nevertheless, “official” map dis-
courses did create the general intellectual and 
political climate in which non-state, privately 
produced maps and geographical writings were 
created and published.7 
Harley’s theoretical inquiry and its potential 
applicability to the early modern Japanese con-
text lead us to pose two broad questions: first, 
what role did maps play in the competition for 
state power, at both shogunal and local levels, in 
the Tokugawa period? More specifically, how did 
the Tokugawa shogunate and the daimyo utilize 
and manipulate maps and mapmaking to gain and 
maintain political power? Secondly, what type of 
relationship existed between state-produced and 
commercial forms of map discourse? Were com-
mercial mapmakers influenced by state mapmak-
ing, and if so, how and to what degree? What 
effects (if any) did state mapmaking have on the 
substantial audience for published maps and geo-
graphical writings in the Edo period? Both these 
sets of questions—the first focusing more on a 
broadly political reading of maps, the second on a 
broadly cultural reading—have been engaged, 
elaborated upon, and debated in recent, largely 
Japanese historical scholarship. The remainder of 
this article will outline the principal arguments 
that have emerged. Although the authors cited 
below do not necessarily agree with one another, 
taken together their views give a well-rounded 
view of the forms and functions of mapping in 
                                                  
7 Scholars disagree about the extent to which 
state mapmaking affected the makers of 
published maps; this debate is discussed in some 
detail below.  
early modern Japan, and indicate areas of poten-
tially fruitful future research.  
 
 
Mapmaking and Statemaking: Understanding 
the Tokugawa Bakufu Kuniezu (Provincial 
Maps) in Domestic and International Contexts 
Most readers will be familiar with the broad 
contours of the Tokugawa shogunate’s attempts to 
map Japan by ordering the compilation of kuniezu 
国絵図 and their accompanying cadastral records 
(gōchō 郷帳), and then constructing from these 
sources three large-scale maps of all Japan (re-
ferred to by scholars as Nihon sōzu 日本総図).8 
To summarize briefly: the Bakufu initiated large-
scale provincial mapping projects in 1604 
(Keichō 9), 1644 (Shōhō 1), 1696 (Genroku 9), 
and 1835 (Tenpō 6).9 For each kuniezu project, 
orders went out to daimyo to cooperate in the 
drawing and submission of province-level 
maps.10  
                                                  
8  The most accessible general English-
language introduction to the kuniezu and other 
premodern Japanese maps can be found in Unno 
Kazutaka, “Cartography in Japan,” in The History 
of Cartography: Cartography in the Traditional 
East and Southeast Asian Societies, edited by J.B. 
Harley and David Woodward, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 346-477.  
9 During the Tenpō era the Bakufu ordered the 
submission of gōchō in 1831 (Tenpō 2), four 
years before it ordered the submission of maps.  
10 The Bakufu’s decision to make provinces, 
and within them districts (gun 郡), the principal 
territorial units represented is significant in that it 
places the kuniezu within the traditions of both 
Japanese and Chinese imperial mapmaking. 
Although Funakoshi Akio 船 越 昭 生  has 
examined the influence of Qing dynasty maps of 
China made the with Jesuit missionaries’ 
assistance on Tokugawa mapmaking, the 
connection between early modern Chinese and 
Japanese state mapmaking certainly merits 
further examination; see Funakoshi, Sakoku 
Nihon ni kita “Kōki zu” no chirigakuteki kenkyū 
鎖国日本にきた「 康煕図」の地理学的研究 
(Tokyo: Hōsei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 1986). 
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Due to shifting technological and political 
climates, each kuniezu project differed slightly 
but significantly from those that preceded or fol-
lowed it. Although the Bakufu issued increasingly 
specific instructions regarding the compilation 
and format of maps, there was considerable varia-
tion in the maps produced. By the Genroku pe-
riod, however, a uniformly high level of stan-
dardization had been achieved.  
These changes over time can be traced in the ku-
niezu themselves. For example, in some Keichō 
and Shōhō kuniezu, individual daimyo holdings 
(both their physical location and their value, as 
estimated in kokudaka 石高) occasionally are 
represented on the maps: in the kuniezu from 
Bungo 豊後 province dating from the Keichō 
(1596-1615) era shown here, each round circle 
symbolizes a village. Inside the circle one finds 
the village name as well as the name of the local 
ryōshu 領主, or lord, and the color of the circle 
also corresponds to the ryōshu domain in which 
the village is located (Figure 1). By looking at 
the map, one can see that the boundaries of ryō-
shu suzerainity did not always correlate with the 
boundaries of districts, for within each district—
demarcated on the map by thick black lines—one 
finds villages controlled by several different ryō-
shu. In the Genroku-era Bungo kuniezu, by con-
trast, all references to daimyo governance were 
eliminated from the map in favor of depicting 
district and province boundaries exclusively: all 
villages are represented by uniform lozenge-
shaped symbols, color-coded to the district, not 
the domain, in which they are located (Figure 2). 
Maps from other provinces show different types 
of discrepancies. For instance, the Shōhō-era ku-
niezu from Ōwari province reproduced in Figure 
3 fails to conform to many of the Bakufu’s carto-
                                                                         
On state mapmaking under the Qing dynasty, see: 
Mark C. Elliott, “The Limits of Tartary: 
Manchuria in Imperial and National 
Geographies,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 
59, No. 3 (2000): 603-46; Laura Hostetler, Qing 
Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and 
Cartography in Early Modern China (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001). For a broad 
survey, see Richard J. Smith, Chinese Maps 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).  
graphic standards: in it, districts are demarcated 
by color, not by black lines as the Bakufu re-
quired; the village symbols (muragata 村型) are 
not color-coded by district, neighboring provinces 
are not set off in different colors, no sea routes 
appear, there is no legend, and the produce of  
 
 
 
Figure 1.  “Keichō Bungo no kuni Hachi-gun ezu,” 
reproduced in Kuniezu no sekai 国絵図の世界, edited 
by Kuniezu Kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Aki Shobō, 2005), p. 
284, plate 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  “Genroku Bungo kuniezu,” reproduced in 
Kuniezu no sekai, op. cit., p. 285, plate 5. 
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Figure 3.  “Shōhō yon-nen Ōwari kuniezu,” repro-
duced in Kuniezu no sekai, op. cit., p. 60, plate 2. 
each village (muradaka 村高) is not precisely 
recorded.11 In the case of the Shōhō-era Ōwari 
map, the Bakufu’s established standards of carto-
graphic representation were all but ignored at the 
province level, but in the Genroku-era map, all 
these discrepancies were rectified and the kuniezu 
conformed completely to Bakufu standards (Fig-
ure 4).   
In the Genroku period, as part of its carto-
graphic standardization efforts, the Bakufu also 
forbade the use of the term “ronchi 論地” or 
“ronsho 論所” (“disputed land”) in provincial 
maps. These terms referred to areas where local 
disputes over territory, boundaries, and/or access 
to resources impeded the drawing of decisive 
boundaries, and they appeared frequently in pro-
vincial maps submitted to the Bakufu for ap-
                                                  
11 This map may be a draft map (which may 
explain its discrepancies), but no later map is 
extant. 
proval. Banning the use of the terms was intended 
to compel daimyo and other local officials to set-
tle disputes over land and territory locally, and 
not simply pass them up the ladder to higher au-
thorities. It is tempting to interpret the erasure of  
 
Figure 4.  “Genroku jū-nen Ōwari kuniezu,” repro-
duced in Kuniezu no sekai, op. cit., p. 61, plate 3. 
domain boundaries and the eradication of evi-
dence of land disputes from the face of the map 
as a type of cartographic silencing particular to 
the Tokugawa context insofar as the provincial 
map became the medium for the negotiation of 
power relations between shogunate and daimyo, 
and local authorities became the objects as well 
as the agents of censorship from higher authori-
ties. However, conflicts that were effectively 
suppressed on the face of provincial maps often 
continued on the ground.  Thus, daimyo and 
other local officials devised ways to obscure 
rather than to resolve their disputes and thus cir-
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cumvent Bakufu demands for resolution.12  
Evidence of these and other changes effected 
in the Genroku period have led to a general 
scholarly consensus that the Genroku kuniezu 
were the most ambitious and comprehensive of 
the provincial mapmaking projects. There is sig-
nificantly less consensus among scholars as to 
whether the maps succeeded in fulfilling the po-
litical and strategic goals of the Bakufu, on the 
one hand, and local powerholders on the other. 
Since the major scholarly debates over kuniezu 
often focus on the Genroku maps, I will briefly 
describe them here.13  
For the Genroku map project, the Bakufu ap-
pointed a quartet of its highest officials to oversee 
the mapping project: the ōmetsuke (chief police 
inspector), the jisha bugyō (magistrate of shrines 
and temples), Edo machi bugyō (city magistrate 
of Edo), and the kanjō bugyō (finance magistrate) 
jointly assumed control of the enterprise at the 
highest level. At the local level, in provinces con-
taining more than one domain, certain daimyo 
were selected to serve as provincial “map inten-
dants” (ezumoto 絵図元). At the outset of the 
kuniezu project, Bakufu officials called the Edo 
representatives of all daimyo together and recited 
a list of detailed instructions for revising the pre-
vious kuniezu from the Shōhō era. At the same 
                                                  
12  Sugimoto Fumiko 杉本史子  describes 
these conflicts in detail in “Kuniezu sakusei jigyō 
to kinsei kokka 「国絵図作成事業と近世国
家」 , Rekishigaku kenkyū 歴史学研究  , No. 
586 (1988), reprinted in Tenbō Nihon rekishi 展
望に本歴史 13: Kinsei kokka 近世国家, edited 
by Fukaya Katsumi 深谷克己 and Hori Shin 堀
新 (Tokyo: Tōkyōdō Shuppan, 2000), pp. 217-
223; a slightly different version of this article also 
appears in: Sugimoto Fumiko, Ryōiki shihai no 
tenkai to kinsei 領 域支 配の 展開 と近世 
(Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1999). 
13  The most detailed survey of kuniezu in 
general and the Genroku kuniezu in particular in 
the context of Tokugawa statemaking is 
Sugimoto Fumiko, “Kuniezu sakusei jigyō to 
kinsei kokka,” op. cit.; see also Sugimoto, Ryōiki 
shihai no tenkai to kinsei, op. cit. Other works on 
kuniezu are discussed in more detail below. 
time, the Bakufu established a map clearinghouse 
(ezugoya) in Edo.  Here, each provincial map 
intendant was required to submit his draft maps 
to a battery of inspections by Bakufu officials. 
Each intendant brought his draft map, a draft of 
the land registers for areas depicted on the map, a 
copy of the Shōhō kuniezu (for comparison to the 
new map), a record of changes made in the land 
registers, and a document attesting to agreement 
with neighboring provinces over boundaries. If 
the new maps met with Bakufu approval, the of-
ficials sent them on to the Bakufu’s designated 
artists (goyō eshi 御用絵師 ) from the Kanō 
school, who would then redraw the draft map in 
final form.  
The comprehensive nature of the Genroku ku-
niezu marked a strategic and symbolic watershed 
in terms of Bakufu-han cooperation in state 
mapmaking. Previous kuniezu projects had been 
far less cohesive in terms of both organization 
and output; the maps produced were not nearly as 
standardized and uniform as the Genroku maps.14 
As we shall see below, the subsequent and final 
Bakufu kuniezu project undertaken in the Tenpō 
era differed considerably from the Genroku pro-
ject in ways that reflected changes in the political 
context of Tokugawa mapmaking. 
Considerable scholarly attention has been de-
voted to kuniezu in Japan; the first studies of 
these maps appeared as early as the late Meiji 
period.15 However, in more recent years study of 
kuniezu has been dominated by two opposing 
                                                  
14 This is not to say the Genroku maps were 
more “accurate” in the terms of modern 
cartographic technology; as Philip Brown has 
shown, surveying and measuring techniques 
remained flawed by modern standards throughout 
the Tokugawa period. See Brown, “The 
Mismeasure of Land: Land Surveying in the 
Tokugawa Period,” Monumenta Nipponica 42:2 
(1987): 115-55; see also Brown, “State, 
Cultivator, Land: Determination of Land Tenures 
in Early Modern Japan Reconsidered, The 
Journal of Asian Studies 56:2 (1997): 412-44. 
15 An article entitled “Honpō chizu kō 本邦地
図孝” appeared in Shigaku zasshi, Vol. 6, Nos. 4-
5, in 1895; cited in Sugimoto Fumiko, Ryōiki 
shihai no tenkai to kinsei, p. 154, p. 163, n. 2. 
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camps: on one side is Kawamura Hirotada 川村
博忠, whose authoritative study Edo bakufu-sen 
kuniezu no kenkyū 江戸幕府選国絵図の研究 
set the agenda for subsequent studies of Toku-
gawa mapmaking.16 On the other side is the his-
torian Kuroda Hideo 黒田日出男 and his col-
leagues and students, most notably Sugimoto 
Fumiko 杉本史子, at Tokyo University’s Shiryō 
Hensanjo who have engaged in an exhaustive 
survey of Tokugawa kuniezu for more than a dec-
ade.17  
Most kuniezu research, including that of 
Kawamura and Kuroda, focuses almost exclu-
sively on the kuniezu as a strictly Japanese phe-
nomenon, which is to say that aside from ac-
knowledging the influence of Chinese imperial 
mapmaking in general and Qing cartography in 
particular, little consideration is given to what the 
Tokugawa mapmaking projects might mean in an 
East Asian or global context. In contrast, Ronald 
Toby recently has examined kuniezu for what 
they say about the formation of the boundaries of 
the early modern state vis-à-vis “borderland” re-
gions like Ezo and Ryūkyū, and neighboring 
states, especially Korea.18 Since the debate be-
                                                  
16  Kawamura Hirotada, Edo bakufu-sen 
kuniezu no kenkyū (Tokyo: Kokon Shoin, 1984), 
p. 233; title hereafter abbreviated as EBSKK; a 
more reader-friendly version of Kawamura’s 
main arguments can be found in his Kuniezu 
(Tokyo:Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1996). Most 
recently, a Kawamura-led team of researchers 
produced a lavishly illustrated large-format book 
containing numerous color reproductions of 
kuniezu from every province, accompanied by 
short explanatory essays: Kuniezu Kenkyūkai, ed., 
Kuniezu no sekai (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 2005).  
17  The most comprehensive and current 
bibliography of research on kuniezu and other 
types of maps and visual materials can be found 
on Sugimoto’s page of the Shiryō Hensanjo 
website: http://www.hi.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/personal/fumiko/bunken.top.html 
18 Ronald Toby ロナルド・トビ, “Kinsei-ki 
no ‘Nihon zu’ to ‘Nihon’ no kyōkai 近世期の
「日本図」と「日本」の境界 ,” in Kuroda 
Hideo, Mary Elizabeth Berry, and Sugimoto 
tween the Kawamura and Kuroda camps as well 
as Toby’s attempt to internationalize the analysis 
of the Tokugawa mapmaking projects all high-
light the major issues in interpreting kuniezu and 
maps in general as historical sources, let us begin 
with outlines of these authors’ main arguments.  
The debate between Kawamura and Kuroda is 
difficult to summarize in part because it is based 
on the two scholars’ differing interpretations of 
identical data drawn from their meticulously de-
tailed analyses of individual kuniezu from each of 
the major Tokugawa mapping projects. It is im-
portant to stress that in addition to considering 
the maps as finished products, both scholars fo-
cus on the totality of the mapping process: from 
Bakufu edict through local execution of the sur-
veying and mapmaking itself, to the submission 
of finished maps and gōchō and, ultimately to the 
compilation by the Bakufu of provincial maps 
into maps of all Japan. The major point of con-
tention between the two sides centers on the de-
gree to which the kuniezu—both the process of 
making them as well as the maps themselves—
represented the successful exercise of Tokugawa 
Bakufu central authority over daimyo and others 
involved in mapmaking at the local level.  
Kawamura tends to see the kuniezu, especially 
the penultimate mapping effort undertaken in the 
Genroku period, as a “symbol of the maturation 
of the bakuhan state.”19 For him, the Bakufu’s 
kuniezu hearkened back in a self-consciously 
symbolic manner to the kokugunzu 国郡図 of 
the classical imperial state, and were part of the 
Bakufu’s attempt to create a “feudal social order 
within the framework of Confucian ideals.”20 In 
general, he sees state mapmaking as part of larger 
process in which the shogunate, from the early 
seventeenth through the early eighteenth centu-
ries, consolidated its ability to compel daimyo to 
submit to its authority in matters of land distribu-
tion and control.21  
                                                                         
Fumiko, eds., Chizu to ezu no seiji bunkashi 地
図と絵図の政治文化史(Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku 
Shuppankai, 2001), pp. 79-102. 
19 Kawamura, EBSKK, p. 233. 
20 Kawamura, Kuniezu, p. 156.  
21 It should be said that Kawamura points out 
the conflicts that occurred as a result of the 
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Kuroda and Sugimoto, by contrast, see kuniezu 
as documents of ongoing conflict and compro-
mise between Bakufu and daimyo in which 
mapmaking served as a “mediating force in the 
relationship between shogun and ryōshu” in mat-
ters of land distribution as well as in mapmaking. 
Each side gained and lost the upper hand in dis-
crete incidents of conflict, Kuroda and Sugimoto 
maintain that each round of map-making must be 
analyzed in its specific historical and spatial con-
text.22  
Scholars on each side marshal formidable tex-
tual evidence drawn from their deep knowledge 
of the kuniezu and related documents. Perhaps 
what distinguishes the Kawamura and Kuroda 
approaches most is the former’s tendency to rely 
                                                                         
Bakufu’s attempts to impose uniform standards 
on mapmaking. He notes, for example, that in 
spite of repeated admonitions to settle boundary 
disputes definitively, local records show that the 
provinces of Chikuzen, Higo, and Iga had, 
respectively, six, eight, and five ongoing 
boundary disputes during the Genroku period. Of 
these nineteen disputes, only five were settled at 
the time the Genroku kuniezu were created; see 
Kawamura, EBSKK, pp. 204-205. One of the six 
disputes in Chikuzen involved a ten-kilometer 
stretch of the boundary that divided both 
Chikuzen and Chikugo provinces and Akitsuki 
and Kurumae domains; it proved so intractable 
that it took the Bakufu courts until 1854 to finally 
resolve it. See Kawamura, “Ezu ni egakareta 
kyōkai no fūkei 絵図に描かれた境界の風景,” 
Chiri 地理  37:12 (1992): p. 41. In the end, 
however, no trace of these conflicts appears on 
the Genroku kuniezu due to the aforementioned 
Bakufu decision to forbid the use of the term 
“ronchi” on maps. For Kawamura, this fact 
shows the power of the Bakufu to silence conflict 
cartographically, if not practically and thus 
enhances his argument for the Bakufu’s 
successful manipulation of the symbolic 
significance of maps.  
22 Sugimoto Fumiko summarizes the debate 
between Kawamura and Kuroda (albeit from her 
perspective from within the Kuroda “camp”) in 
Sugimoto, Ryōiki shihai no tenkai to kinsei, 
op.cit., pp. 155-158.  
on a formalist analysis of maps, in which maps 
reflect quite directly the political goals of their 
makers. Kuroda and Sugimoto are more cautious 
about constructing general theories about Bakufu 
or ryōshu power based on map content alone, and 
rely instead on densely detailed analyses rooted 
in specific maps and in the times, places, and cir-
cumstances of their production.  
A good example of the differences between the 
Kawamura and Kuroda approaches is the two 
sides’ interpretation of the Tenpō kuniezu, the last 
set of provincial maps made by the shogunate. 
Unlike in previous kuniezu, daimyo in the early 
nineteenth century refused outright to submit 
maps in response to the Bakufu’s demand and 
shogunal officials ended up drafting and compil-
ing the maps themselves. 23  Kawamura, like 
many scholars of kuniezu before and after him, 
sees the Tenpō mapping project as a political fail-
ure, a sign of increasing weakness on the part of 
the Bakufu. By contrast, Kuroda and Sugimoto 
compare the Tenpō kuniezu to their predecessors 
in the Genroku period in order to see exactly 
what types of changes occurred in the mapmak-
ing process. They show how in the Genroku pe-
riod peasants (hyakushō) and their lands were 
surveyed by ryōshu, who would then draw up 
maps to be submitted for confirmation by local 
and, later, Bakufu officials. In the Tenpō kuniezu, 
however, the Bakufu bypassed uncooperative 
ryōshu and ordered villages to submit village 
maps (mura ezu) directly to Bakufu authorities, 
who then used them to compile kuniezu them-
selves. Kuroda and Sugimoto argue that this shift 
reveals a social and political change that took 
place between the Genroku and Tenpō eras, and 
that in the latter period the Bakufu was compelled 
to communicate more directly with the people, 
thereby creating new avenues for the exercise of 
power as well as new antagonisms between ruler 
                                                  
23  The major point of contention was the 
Bakufu’s shift to the use of jitsudaka (“actual” 
crop yield) in place of the “assigned” kokudaka 
previously in use. The daimyo perceived the 
potential political and economic disadvantages in 
acknowledging to the Bakufu any practical 
increases in productivity within their domains. 
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and ruled.24 In other words, rather than evidence 
of simple political decline Sugimoto and Kuroda 
see an institution (the Bakufu) facing unprece-
dented challenges and attempting to craft new—if 
imperfect—solutions. 
While both Kawamura’s and Kuroda’s analy-
ses of kuniezu focus on the implications of Toku-
gawa state mapmaking for understanding domes-
tic political relations in the early modern period, 
neither makes an extended effort to place kuniezu 
in a regional larger regional or global context. 
Ronald Toby undertakes this task in “Boundaries 
in ‘Maps of Japan’ and the Boundaries of ‘Japan’ 
in the Early Modern Era,” published in Japanese 
as part of a collection of essays edited by Kuroda 
Hideo, Mary Elizabeth Berry, and Sugimoto 
Fumiko to mark the culmination of a three-year 
cooperative international research project on 
early modern Japanese maps and mapmaking.25 
Toby’s aim is to discern the differences between 
the images of Japan as represented in Tokugawa 
maps and the “Japan” imagined by the greater 
community of map readers and users in the Toku-
gawa period. He compares the boundaries of Ja-
pan depicted in the Bakufu maps to the bounda-
ries of Japan as depicted and described in pub-
lished maps and encyclopedic geographical texts. 
Toby pays particular attention to the depiction of 
neighboring territories, especially the borderland 
regions of Ezo and Ryūkyū. He argues that the 
many discrepancies visible among Bakufu maps 
themselves, and between Bakufu maps and com-
mercially published maps and geographical writ-
ings, indicates that the boundaries of Japan—as a 
geographical entity as well as an “imagined 
community”—were far from definitive or consis-
tent. Instead, he emphasizes, they were literally 
and figuratively “ragged” (giza giza).26  
According to Toby, the Bakufu repeatedly or-
dered Ezo and Ryūkyū to submit provincial maps 
                                                  
24 Sugimoto, Ryōiki shihai no tenkai to kinsei, 
pp. 157-158. 
25 See Ronald Toby, “Kinsei-ki no ‘Nihon zu’ 
to ‘Nihon’ no kyōkai,” op. cit.; note that 
translations of Toby’s title, and of all quotes from 
his article are mine.  
26 Toby, Kinsei-ki no ‘Nihon zu’ to ‘Nihon’ no 
kyōkai,” pp. 86-87. 
as part of the various kuniezu efforts, indicating 
that the Bakufu envisioned both regions as infe-
rior sub-states ostensibly subject to its control 
(much as daimyo domains were) in theory, if not 
in practice. However, cartographically as well as 
politically, the assimilation of borderland territo-
ries was much more complicated. Toby points out 
that despite demanding kuniezu from Ryūkyū, the 
region appears only once, in the Genroku period, 
on a map of all Japan compiled by the Bakufu, 
and in official diplomatic relations the Bakufu 
treated Ryūkyū as a “foreign” country. As for Ezo, 
the Bakufu’s maps of the region showed details 
only in the Wajinchi, the areas in the south con-
trolled or dominated by mainland Japanese; eve-
rything else in Ezo was more or less unknown 
territory, mapped in a vague and highly abstract 
manner.27 Such “ambiguous” (aimai) treatment 
of Ezo and Ryūkyū on the part of the Bakufu, 
Toby asserts, indicates a remarkably ambivalent 
official attitude toward what did and did not con-
stitute the Japanese early modern state.28 
The inconsistency between one Bakufu map 
and another is only part of the problem, however, 
for Toby points to considerable differences be-
tween the “Japan” depicted in Bakufu maps and 
that shown in published maps and encyclopedias. 
He points out, for example, that the Fusōkoku no 
zu 扶桑国之図 initially published by Nakabaya-
shi Yoshibe in Kanbun 寛文 6 (1666) depicts 
Ezo as quite separate from the rest of Japan (Fig-
ure 5) and the widely disseminated maps of Ishi-
kawa Ryūsen show the domain of Matsumae as 
an island separate from the rest of Ezo in a man-
ner similar to the Meireki-era Bakufu map of the 
region (Figure 6). However, Ryusen’s maps, 
unlike their Bakufu-made predecessors, shows 
part of a large island representing Ezo looming to 
the north; it also depicts mythical lands from me- 
                                                  
27 Toby, Kinsei-ki no ‘Nihon zu’ to ‘Nihon’ no 
kyōkai,” p. 84; Toby here acknowledges that he is 
citing the research of Brett L. Walker; see Walker, 
The Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology and 
Culture in Japanese Expansion, 1590-1800 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 
pp. 44-45.  
28 Toby, Kinsei-ki no ‘Nihon zu’ to ‘Nihon’ no 
kyōkai,” pp. 82-85.  
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Figure 5.  “Fusōkoku no zu,” reproduced in Akioka 
Takejirō, ed., Nihon kochizu shūsei: Nihon zenzu 日本
古地図集成：日本全図 (Tokyo: Kajima Shuppankai, 
1971), plate 24. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Ishikawa Ryūsen, “Honchō zukan kōmoku 
本朝図鑑綱目,” reproduced in ibid., plate 30. 
 
 
dieval lore (the “no-man’s-land” called “Gandō” 
贋道  or “Kari no michi ” to the north, and 
“Rasetsu-koku 羅刹国,” the “island of women” 
to the south) that never appear on Bakufu maps. 
Other maps show still other visions of Japan: as 
Toby notes, the Shinsen Dai Nihon zuran 新選大
日本図覧(author unknown, Enpō 延宝 6 [1678], 
collection of the Kobe City Museum) resembles 
Ishikawa Ryūsen’s map, yet does not show 
mythical lands and more consistently depicts the 
borderland regions of Ezo and Ryūkyū as distinct 
from the rest of the archipelago, not as an integral 
part of a visually unified whole.29  
                                                  
29 Toby, Kinsei-ki no ‘Nihon zu’ to ‘Nihon’ no 
kyōkai,” pp. 88-91; curiously, Toby refers to the 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Maps from Wakan sansai zue are repro-
duced in Wakan sansai zue (I), in Nihon shōmin seika-
tsu shiryō shūsei 日本庶民資料集成, Vol. 28, edited by 
Tanikawa Ken’ichi 谷川健一 (Tokyo: San’ichi Shobō, 
1980), pp. 917-918. 
 
                                                                         
Shinsen Dai Nihon zuran as being more 
“advanced” (susunde iru) (p. 90) than the maps of 
Ishikawa Ryūsen or other contemporary 
mapmakers, a description that seems at odds with 
his otherwise anti-teleological argument.  
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Published geographic encyclopedias, Toby ar-
gues, show similarly inconsistent treatment of 
Ezo and Ryūkyū. Nishikawa Jōken’s 西川如見 
Ka’i tsūshō kō 華夷通商孝 does not consider 
Ezo at all, and places both Ryūkyū and Korea 
(Chōsen) in the category of gaikoku 外国, the 
middle of three categories of foreignness: Chū-
goku 中国 (the Chinese empire and countries 
within the Sinocentric order); gaikoku (foreign, or 
outside countries), and gai’i 外異  (countries 
both “outside” and “foreign”). The maps in Tera-
jima Ryōan’s multi-volume Wakan sansai zue 和
漢三才図絵 show Ryūkyū and Ezo as “igoku” 
異国, a status shared by Korea, Ryūkyū, and the 
Indian subcontinent (Tenjiku 天竺), among oth-
ers (Figure 7). In the Wakan sansai zue’s narra-
tive description of relations between the three 
countries, however, Ryūkyū and Ezo are treated 
as part of “Dai Nihon” 大日本. Hayashi Shihei, 
the controversial expert on Japan’s late-
eighteenth century defense policies, grouped Ezo, 
Ryūkyū, and Chōsen together as the three “for-
eign” (gaikoku) countries with which the Bakufu 
should be most concerned to defend itself.30 
The variety of opinions concerning who and 
what constitutes Japan in published texts, and 
their variance with respect to Bakufu maps leads 
Toby to conclude that the Bakufu vision of an 
integral Japan which ideally included Ezo and 
Ryūkyū, was not transmitted to the general popu-
lace. Indeed, the “ragged” official boundaries of 
Japan seem to be even less solid in published 
maps, and hence in the popular imagination. Toby 
argues that the Bakufu vision of Japan did not 
compel any sort of cartographic orthodoxy 
among commercial mapmakers because the sho-
gunate jealously guarded map information as se-
cret; he repeatedly invokes “Foucault’s Panopti-
con” (sic) to propose that the shogunate wished to 
retain for itself the unique power to surveil and 
order the realm through maps.31  
                                                  
30 Toby, Kinsei-ki no ‘Nihon zu’ to ‘Nihon’ no 
kyōkai,” pp. 91-96.  
31 Toby, Kinsei-ki no ‘Nihon zu’ to ‘Nihon’ no 
kyōkai,” pp. 85, 97; The Panopticon is not 
Foucault’s creation; Foucault, in Discipline and 
Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: 
Toby’s arguments provide an opportunity to 
reconnect with Harley’s theses regarding map 
secrecy and to address the important and difficult 
issue of how map information was disseminated 
in the Tokugawa period. One of Harley’s princi-
pal arguments regarding the political functions of 
mapmaking is that “weak” states often keep map 
information secret, while stronger states tend to 
make map information public, in order to display 
cartographic knowledge as a symbol of the power 
of their own regimes.32 In similar fashion, Toby 
argues strongly that the Bakufu kept its maps se-
cret, and that this secrecy was a means of gaining 
and maintaining power. Toby takes issue with 
scholars (specifically, with Kawamura Hirotada 
and me) who argue that there were both direct 
and indirect links between Bakufu-commissioned 
maps and commercially published maps. 33 
Toby’s main body of evidence is the many dis-
crepancies between official and commercial maps, 
notably those outlined above. His argument rests 
on the premise that, had commercial mapmakers 
had access to Bakufu maps, they would have cop-
ied them, and done so in discernible ways. In the 
putative absence of Bakufu models, he reasons, 
commercial mapmakers envisioned the bounda-
ries of “Japan” in various, contradictory and in-
consistent ways. Toby presents these perspectives 
even though he explicitly acknowledges that 
there is “no way of knowing” for certain whether 
authors of published maps had access to Bakufu 
maps or other state-produced information, and if 
so, when and how.34  
I concur that there is much that remains un-
known about the details regarding the transmis-
sion of map information, but while Toby points to 
irrefutable concrete differences between Bakufu 
                                                                         
Vintage, 1995), is referring to Jeremy Bentham’s 
famous invention.  
32 Harley, “Silences and Secrecy,” op. cit., pp. 
60-61. 
33 Kawamura makes the argument for direct 
influence of Bakufu maps on commercially 
published maps numerous times, but does not 
give any evidence for his claims. My own 
arguments are explained below.  
34 Toby, “Kinsei-ki no ‘Nihon zu’ to ‘Nihon’ 
no kyōkai,” p. 99. 
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maps and commercially published maps, one can 
make a counter-argument using evidence of the 
direct and indirect influence of Bakufu maps on 
commercially published maps. I have argued 
elsewhere that the Bakufu did little to keep its 
maps of cities and of Japan secret, based on ex-
amples of what seem to me to be fairly clear inci-
dences of commercial mapmakers borrowing in-
formation from Bakufu maps or even copying 
them directly. In one case, Fujii Hanchi, a Bakufu 
official who aided in the mapping of the city of 
Edo in 1658, subsequently gained permission 
from the Bakufu to publish the maps under the 
pseudonym Ochikochi Dōin.35 A published 1666 
atlas was made by copying, dividing, and reduc-
ing in scale the first Bakufu map of Japan, a prac-
tice that was repeated throughout the Tokugawa 
period and into the early Meiji, as kuniezu were 
copied and reprinted in woodblock form as pub-
lished regional maps (Figure 8).36 Aside from 
their differing treatment of Ezo, Nagakubo Seki-
sui’s much-reproduced map Nihon yochi rotei 
zenzu 日本輿地路程全図 (Figure 9) bears a 
clear resemblance to the Bakufu map of Japan 
produced in the Kyōhō period (c. 1702, Figure 
10).37 The resemblance is more evident if one 
looks at the maps in outline form Figure 11. Fi-
nally, in what seems to me to be the most striking 
instance of lack of strategic cartographic secrecy, 
                                                  
35 See Yamori Kazuhiko 矢守一彦, Kochizu 
e no tabi 古 地 図 へ の 旅  (Tokyo: Asahi 
Shinbunsha, 1992), p. 107; see also Marcia 
Yonemoto, “The ‘Spatial Vernacular’ in 
Tokugawa Maps,” The Journal of Asian Studies, 
Vol. 59, No. 3 (2000): 650-657. 
36  Numerous reproductions of such printed 
kuniezu can be found in Yamashita Kazumasa 山
下和正, Chizu de yomu Edo jidai 地図で読む江
戸時代 (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1998), pp. 58-
96.  
37  Sekisui is known to have studied with 
disciples of Shibukawa Shunkai (1639-1715), an 
astronomer in the employ of the shogunate during 
the time the Kyōhō map of Japan was being made. 
See Marcia Yonemoto, Mapping Early Modern 
Japan: Space, Place, and Culture in the 
Tokugawa Period (1603-1868) (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003), pp. 35-43. 
 
Figure 8.  “Nihon bunkeizu 日本分形図,” Kanbun 6 
(1666), reproduced in Nihon kochizu taisei 日本古地
図大成, edited by Unno Kazutaka (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 
1972), p. 44 and p. 49, illustration no. 21. 
 
 
Figure 9.  Nagakubo Sekisui, “Kaisei Nihon yochi 
rotei zenzu 改正日本輿地路程全図,” Bunka 文化 8 
(1811), reproduced in Yamashita Kazumasa 山下和正, 
Japanese Maps of the Edo Period 地図で読む江 戸時
代 (Tokyo: Aki Shobō, 1998), pp. 50-51, plate 1. 
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Figure 10.  “Kyōhō Nihonzu 享保日本図 ,” repro-
duced in Kuniezu no sekai, op. cit., pp. 22-23, plate 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Comparative outline maps are from: 
Marcia Yonemoto, Mapping Early Modern Japan: Space, 
Place, and Culture in the Tokugawa Period (1603-1868) 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 38. 
 
 
the shogunate not only allowed its major rivals 
for power—the daimyo—access to cartographic 
information, it delegated the daimyo themselves 
to carry out the business of official mapmaking. 
Of course this ostensible privilege was in actual-
ity a time- and resource-consuming obligation 
that daimyo fulfilled out of duty to the shogunate, 
and one to which daimyo sometimes gave short 
shrift.  
 
 
Harley Revisited 
 
These debates return us to the questions posed 
at the beginning of this article regarding the role 
maps played in the competition for state power at 
both shogunal and local levels in the Tokugawa 
period and the type of relationship that existed 
between state-produced and commercial forms of 
map discourse. With regard to the former issue, 
for both shogunate and daimyo the politics of 
power witnessed in and through mapmaking was 
a succession of gains and losses, and of assertions 
of strength followed by evidence of weakness 
that makes labels like “strong state” or “weak 
state” oversimplified and inappropriate. Toku-
gawa Bakufu maps do not “symbolize” a single 
or simple set or ideas; they represent a process of 
negotiation between forms and levels of authority. 
Tokugawa mapmaking reveals the ways in which 
political power was generated, displayed, exer-
cised, and contested, and shows the complexity 
and ambiguity of shogunal authority and daimyo 
autonomy alike. With regard to the latter issue, if 
in Bakufu maps the visual representation of the 
polity provided a framework for the articulation 
and negotiation of power, the same can be said 
about commercially published maps of Japan. 
The diversity of map images and their wide dis-
semination is a testament to the vitality of print 
and popular culture, and of the relatively free, 
heterodox intellectual climate in which such di-
versification and circulation took place.38  
                                                  
38 This is in direct contrast to Harley’s claim 
of “indeterminate silence” in early modern 
European maps. On the wide circulation of many 
forms of “public information” in the early 
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Although consensus about the transmission of 
map information from “official” to “private” 
hands may be difficult to reach, in the end, the 
disagreements between the scholars discussed 
above are not as important as the complementary 
aspects of their scholarship. Kuroda’s and Sugi-
moto’s research on kuniezu focuses on the domes-
tic political implications of Tokugawa state map-
making. My own work on Tokugawa maps, too, 
generally looks inward, toward establishing links 
between maps and other forms of cultural produc-
tion that manifested a distinctly spatial sensibility, 
a mapping impulse. Toby’s work, by contrast, 
looks outward to understand how and why early 
modern Japanese maps and encyclopedias reflect 
an insular, relatively weak Japanese “territorial 
consciousness” (kokudo ninshiki) vis-à-vis 
neighboring states or regions, a consciousness 
that is often at odds with the official diplomatic 
stance toward those same states or regions. This 
aspect of Toby’s argument is most instructive in 
that it shows how early modern Japan, as distinct 
from early modern European (and modern global) 
states, had a firm sense of itself as a cohesive 
cultural entity without having a correspondingly 
firm sense of exactly where its boundaries lay.39 
An examination of mapmaking in early mod-
ern Japan shows us that maps constitute as well 
as contest the political status quo, and they do so 
through strategies of silence as well as those of 
representation, for when maps are ideologically 
deployed, they utilize suppression as well as ex-
pression in equal measure. We can productively 
read enforced silences in maps as a form of po-
litical discourse, and by doing so we can help 
bring maps and other visual materials more fully 
into the purview of intellectual, political, and cul-
                                                                         
modern period, see Mary Elizabeth Berry’s new 
book, Japan in Print: Information and Nation in 
the Early Modern Period (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2006).  
39  Further research comparing the early 
modern Japanese case to other non-European 
states (one such case being Siam, as discussed in 
Thongchai Winichakul’s Siam Mapped: A 
History of the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 1994) would be 
extremely useful.  
tural history. Mapping doesn’t belong in some 
separate category, exempt from or inimical to the 
forms of analysis that we apply to other texts. We 
know we will have ceased to marginalize the map 
when we stop assuming that scholars who “do” 
maps are different from scholars who “do” politi-
cal, cultural, or even literary history, of the early 
modern or other eras. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
